Emotions still run VERY deep on tha SB loss
Read this entire thing..You will be shocked and be left with mouth open..I know I was.
Read this entire thing..You will be shocked and be left with mouth open..I know I was.
Phoenix - Even now, 10 years after the fact, the cut is deep, the memories fresh and the recrimination endless.
Each time that Ron Wolf tries to get past the Green Bay Packers' 31-24 upset defeat at the hands of the Denver Broncos in Super Bowl XXXII, he remembers how the course of history might have and, in his strong opinion, should have been altered.
The retired general manager holds former coach Mike Holmgren primarily responsible for the crushing setback in San Diego, possibly the most haunting in the franchise's 87-year existence.
"Certain calls were to be made that weren't made," Wolf said during a trip to Green Bay in August. "Mike Holmgren refused those calls. There would have been an adjustment on the blocking scheme and it would have been over.
"One of the great things about playing the game of football is you have to adjust. When you fail to adjust in critical situations you're going to lose, and that's what happened here. To be pig-headed about it, I mean, to have the answer and then not apply it, that's a little different."
Wolf was referring to the Packers' inability to handle the blitzing of Broncos defensive coordinator Greg Robinson that changed the complexion of the entire game.
It wasn't a great day for any number of key Green Bay participants, including the late Fritz Shurmur, coordinator of the defense; quarterback Brett Favre; and defensive end Reggie White. But Wolf kept coming back to Holmgren because the simplest solution was his and he didn't execute it.
How was Wolf, who seldom concerned himself with X's and O's, made aware that Holmgren mishandled the offense?
"I found this out about four years ago," Wolf said. "Two people told me about it that were in a position to know. I could tell you who they were but they wouldn't tell you. They were coaches."
A request made to Dave Pearson, the Seattle Seahawks' director of communications and broadcasting, for an interview with Holmgren wasn't acknowledged.
Holmgren's offensive line coach, Tom Lovat, said last week that he had never discussed the issue with Wolf.
Of the other offensive coaches on the staff in 1997, Wolf is closest to Andy Reid. Wolf has made at least one, sometimes two trips per year to Philadelphia from his home in Annapolis, Md., for friendly visits with the man who was the Packers' quarterbacks coach that year.
Wolf has not talked to Holmgren about what he has learned and says he never will. Their relationship, though cordial, was never quite the same after Holmgren left for Seattle in January 1999.
"It's over and I'm out of the game," he said. "It's all hearsay. The only ones who could substantiate it would be the people involved, the coaches or the players.
"I'm probably still not over it. It's like a dot in history now, and one of the teams was a one-year wonder. But for somebody to bring it up and explain to you what could have been done and what should have been done, it rekindles the fire every once in a while."
Granted, the Packers did score 24 points and gain 350 yards. On the other hand, Denver had 302 yards, including 179 on the ground. Terrell Davis rushed 30 times for 157 yards despite being sidelined for all but one play of the second quarter after a kick in the head caused his vision to blur.
"The whole thing was we couldn't stop the run," said Tom Lovat, Holmgren's offensive line coach at the time. "Anybody will tell you that."
As Wolf put it, that was the day "our defensive line went away." White made one tackle and was on the ground far too much, Gilbert Brown tired badly and Darius Holland, subbing for injured Gabe Wilkins at right end, was run ragged by tackle Gary Zimmerman.
Still, the Packers might have been able to outscore the Broncos because of their suspect secondary had it not been for four or five plays that went haywire largely because of the blitzing. Two of those blitzes caused turnovers, set up 10 first-half points and put the Packers in a 17-7 deficit from which they could never regain the lead.
When told of Wolf's remarks, safety LeRoy Butler said there was no doubt in his mind that the issue was Holmgren's refusal to keep more blockers in for pass protection.
"He's my favorite coach of all time," Butler said. "But he wanted five eligible (receivers) out. Keeping guys in was too boring for him. He was trying to show off."
In an interview two years ago, Robinson said the only other occasion in his career in which he ever blitzed more was one game against New England's Drew Bledsoe. In all, the Broncos rushed five or more on 48.9% of the Packers' 45 dropbacks and six or more on 24.4%.
"It's all about time," Robinson said. "They didn't have time. Mike Holmgren's a good coach and they were sound. But I don't think they were totally set up for the systematic approach that we took.
"Later in Mike's career, they changed and we had to do some adapting. That's kind of what his world went to. Protecting instead of letting them get out and trying to let the quarterback get rid of it."
Two year ago, Favre said the Broncos in that Super Bowl "kind of revolutionized the weak-safety or weak-corner blitz. The West Coast had never seen that. Seeing that type of blitz, you had to change your protection totally. Now everyone does it."
On the second play of the game, Robinson sent the house and a message to Favre with an all-out pressure; referee Ed Hochuli probably should have called intentional grounding. Green Bay capped that opening 76-yard drive with a 22-yard touchdown pass to Antonio Freeman, but after that it was a never-ending struggle for the offense.
"Historically, we were pretty damn good at sideline adjustments," guard Aaron Taylor said in 2006. "But I remember the entire game we didn't know where they were coming from. I think because we were so good on adjustments there was an element where we got out-coached. But I'm not putting it all on the coaches. As players, we didn't help ourselves out at all."
When the Packers got the ball back, Favre faked a second-and-5 handoff on a 5-step drop as both running backs went out through the middle. Cornerback Darrien Gordon blitzed off the weak side, forcing Favre to scramble right. He overthrew Robert Brooks and the ball was intercepted by safety Tyrone Braxton.
Denver then went 45 yards in eight plays to take the lead, 14-7.
"The problem early was Mike was 'scatting' the backs," tight end Mark Chmura said. "Say we'd have a '22 Scat Texas.' Scat means the back is out right away. If he takes the 'scat' off then the back checks for the blitz. We got burned on it I don't know how many times. Play-action will freeze that guy for a second but it's not going to prevent him from blitzing."
Early in the second quarter, Robinson blitzed seven against a six-man protection and safety Steve Atwater slammed into Favre in 1.59 seconds just as he was setting up to deliver on his fifth step. The ball was fumbled, the Broncos recovered and three plays later it was 17-7.
Agreeing that the weak-side blitzing in which the brazen Broncos left the middle of the field wide open was unheard of, Chmura still said adjustments should have been made to handle it after the first series.
"It should have been easy," he said. "Our max protections were 24 and 25, which kept two backs in. 74 and 75, we could do that out of two tight ends. And he just didn't do that. He tried to roll the dice because we had such an explosive offense."
In January 2002, the late Will McDonough of the Boston Globe wrote a column in which he remembered being one of several writers asking Holmgren about the Denver blitz at the NFL owners meetings a few months after the game.
"We practiced everything they threw at us," Holmgren was quoted as having said. "And we went over them many times with Brett. We told him, no matter what, when you see them coming, get the ball out of there. Don't hold on to it to make the big play. . . . There were many times he didn't do that in the game, and it cost us. It led to two turnovers. He saw it coming and didn't pay attention to it."
Retorted Chmura: "That's a flat-out lie. How can you get rid of the ball when the receiver is running a 15- or 20-yard in or dig? You can't scream to him and tell him, 'Blitz!' We weren't a sight blitz team. The receivers weren't responsible for seeing if there's blitz and breaking their route off accordingly. That's a bunch of crap."
For his part, Lovat said the remarks by Holmgren "pretty well sum up the whole scenario. If the protection didn't fit, rather than audible, which you don't want to do a lot of, Brett was told to get the ball out. He had outlets."
Later, Holmgren would shorten the drops for Favre and Matt Hasselbeck, most notably against Pittsburgh in Super Bowl XL. In Super Bowl XXXII, Favre threw 15 times off three steps, 16 times off five steps and nine times off seven steps.
Early that next off-season, Lovat recalled Holmgren and the offensive staff watching "that damn Super Bowl film" about 10 times. The Packers devised a 50 protection in which both backs could get to the side of the blitz without weakening the play.
"In other words, you're getting your blockers to the blitz and still not having to go maximum protection," Lovat said. "We took it to Seattle with us and it worked well. You don't see Robinson in the league anymore." He is head coach at Syracuse.
Should Holmgren and his coaches have been able to implement it that day at Qualcomm Stadium?
"No," Lovat replied. "This was an off-season discussion. Plus, the fact if they (the Broncos) hit you once they've got to be right the next time around. If you start on the sidelines pulling your horns in then you get so conservative you're playing into their hands."
Holmgren also has been criticized for giving Dorsey Levens just one carry after the 8-minute mark of the third quarter against an undersized front. On Wednesday, at Super Bowl XLII, Levens still seemed annoyed that he didn't get more than 19 carries (for 90 yards) in a bid to rescue a defense that Butler said had been reduced at the end to "huffin' and puffin' with their tongues hanging out."
"You take some of the pressure off Brett and give our defense a chance to rest and maybe we could shut down Terrell Davis from running all over us," Levens said. "I don't think we helped the defense out with the play-calling in the second half."
Robinson said he "didn't really care, to be honest with you," if Levens would have had a lot more carries.
"If they had decided they were going to try to bloody our nose, we were prepared for that," he added.
Mainly when the Broncos didn't blitz, Favre had occasion to pass for 256 yards and three touchdowns. His passer rating was 91.0.
"Brett always said if he had time he'd take that secondary apart," Butler said. "They couldn't cover Antonio or 'Chewy' (Chmura), really, or Dorsey out of the backfield."
The Broncos' offensive game plan was only slightly less imaginative than on defense. From the onset of preparation, coach Mike Shanahan determined that he wanted to feature Davis, and to do so he needed to coax Butler out of the box.
"LeRoy was killing people in the run game," Mike Heimerdinger, the Broncos' wide receivers coach at the time, said in '05. "Nobody ever really accounted for him. Mike's idea was to get him isolated and get him out of there. Once we had him on Shannon (Sharpe), we could go the other way and do some things."
If not for Butler's sure, saving tackles, Davis might have had 200 yards. But most of them were downfield, a situation that Butler implored Shurmur to correct schematically.
"I told Fritz what to do," Butler said. "I said, 'All we've got to do is go back to our normal eight-man front. Now I don't have to follow Shannon. Let the corners stay out there. I can cover the slot guy but I have no man responsibilities and I'm still in the box.'
"We ran it twice and I was able to get him (Davis) for a 2-yard gain and once I got a hit on the quarterback. He never ran it again.
"At halftime, we made no adjustments. We just sat there and drank Kool-Aid, and they *****ed at us for a while."
Finally, it was time for the last act. The next morning, as he prepared to board a team bus for the airport, Holmgren admitted that he had lost track of the down with 1:47 left, when it actually was second and goal from the 1 instead of first and goal. Holmgren ordered his defense to let Davis score what turned out to be the winning points on the next play, a move designed to preserve his two timeouts and have time to tie the score.
Although the argument has been made that fumbles and penalties and slips and assorted other odd things still might have transpired to keep Denver out of the end zone, players such as Butler and Chmura agreed with Holmgren's decision.
So the Packers had their final shot. A screen to Levens gained 22. Another screen to the big back picked up 13. On second and 6 from the Denver 31, Freeman was hit in stride with a bullet pass at the 15 but suffered the costliest drop of his career. Having sent only four rushers on the first five plays, Robinson came with six on third down and caused Favre to throw hurriedly and incomplete to Robert Brooks at the 9.
Hochuli charged each team with a timeout after the play because each side had an injured player. Thus, Holmgren had an eternity (2:10) to make his call on fourth and 6 with 32 seconds left.
"The last call of the game was maybe the dumbest ever," Chmura said. "You should have seen the look in the huddle when Two Jet Winston comes in. We had never run this play all year long. We maybe practiced it three times in training camp and this is the best you can give us? A player knows when his number is called. Two Jet Winston is no one's number called."
Two Jet means a six-man protection with two wide receivers left and two receivers right, one of which was Chmura in the slot. Having lost two defensive backs on the previous play, Robinson went for broke with a seven-man rush.
"We had time to think because of the injuries," Robinson said. "It was, like, 'You've got to take a chance right now...... to see if we can end it.'"
To Favre's left, the unblocked man, Braxton, slipped through untouched. According to Chmura, all four receivers had been coached to run their routes at 12 yards.
"If he goes Two Jet Double Slant, the receivers are three steps and cutting in," Chmura said. "He's still got plenty of time. The only thing Brett could have done was check but that's really not his fault."
Chmura saw seven blitzers charging and decided Favre's only chance would be if he broke off the route at the first-down marker. But linebacker John Mobley, in man-to-man coverage, cut in front of Chmura and broke up the floater to end the game.
"I decided I better just give Brett an option, but we were coached we had to get to 12 so I didn't know what the hell the option was," Chmura said. "He had good coverage on me. It was just a bad call. Even Brett was confused."
John Elway finally had won a Super Bowl. His team, an 11½-point underdog, had broken the NFC's 13-game winning streak. It remains the greatest moment in Denver sports history even though the Broncos proved they were absolutely no fluke by pummeling Atlanta in the next Super Bowl.
Some will say the Packers were the victims of their own press clippings. The blame game will be played for as long as Packers fans toss back beers at neighborhood taverns.
In the locker room that night, Wolf would say unforgettably, "We're a one-year wonder, just a fart in the wind." And after being stunned 12 days ago in the NFC Championship Game, the Packers still haven't returned to the Big One.
"You try to analyze it," Wolf said. "There's probably never been a greater team in pro football than the 1985 Chicago Bears and they only won it one year. Then I decided, 'Maybe it's a Midwest thing. Maybe we idolize our players too much, give them too much adoration.'
"Suddenly there was a different kind of focus out there. And just what (Bill) Romanowski said. We were fat cats. Maybe they did want it more than we did.
"Winners can say whatever they want to say. Losers can only lament what might have been."
