If my numbers are correct the difference is 0.059 in favor of going for two. The Packers scored a total of 60 TDs, so that would result in an additional three or four points. While that doesn't sound like a whole lot it could result in an additional win.
The difference is bigger when taking a look at teams running the ball on a two-point conversion with a success rate of 57.1%. That would result in additional 12 points for a team like the 2014 Packers. But for whatever reason teams have only run the ball on 28.3% of the two-point conversions in the last five years.
Right...I was quoting you quoting vince. If vince's numbers are correct, the difference is 0.02, or a one point differential over 50 TDs.
Regardless, whether it's 1 point or 3 points over 50 TDs, that differential can't be captured unless you go for 2
every time, regardless of the game situation
. As for your 6 points when running the ball, if a team went for 2 every time and ran the ball on each occasion, we could expect the small advantage to disappear in a regression to the mean, so I discount it. Whether running or passing, if a team decides to go for 2 every time, opponents will be accumulating tape and will focus more closely on it in game planning.
When you start applying go-for-two to every game situation, there are potential unintended consequences. Down 7...score a TD...kick to tie: momentum is still on your side. But if you fail in going for 2 you give the opponent an emotional lift.
Which brings to mind the established habits of NFL coaches in late game opportunities. When having the choice of kicking an EP and going to overtime vs. going all-or-nothing on a 2 pointer, they nearly always kick. I doubt a tiny improvement in odds differential will change that thinking. Now project that thinking to other game situations.
I doubt this very minor change in the calculus is going to result in noticeable behavioral changes. It took coaches decades, going back to the days before the current golden age of place kicking, to figure out that attempting a FG on 4th. and 1 on the opponents 35 (or worse...punting) is an unfavorable proposition.
I see this very minor change in the calculus resulting in very minor changes in coaching behavior.
There is one prediction I'll make with a high level of confidence. If Crosby has an EP blocked on an opening drive TD and the Packers lose the game by one point, there will be a contingent arguing the Packers (or any other team for that matter) should have gone for 2 while ignoring all of the the other woulda, shoulda, coulda in the intervening 55 minutes of football.